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Abstract
This paper develops an information-based theory of international currency based on search
frictions, private trading histories, and imperfect recognizability of assets. Using an open-
economy search model with multiple competing currencies, the value of each currency is de-
termined without requiring agents to use a particular currency to purchase a country’s goods.
Strategic complementarities in portfolio choices and information acquisition decisions generate
multiple equilibria with different types of payment arrangements. While some inflation can ben-
efit the country issuing an international currency, the threat of losing international status puts
an inflation discipline on the issuing country. When monetary authorities interact in a simple
policy game, the temptation to inflate can lead optimal policy to deviate from the Friedman
rule. A calibration of the generalized model shows that for the U.S. dollar, the welfare cost of
losing international status ranges from 1.3% to 2.1% of GDP per year.
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1 Introduction
The U.S. dollar plays a central role in the international monetary system. The 2006 Treasury re-
ports that nearly 60% of dollar banknotes in circulation are held abroad. Over the last half century,
the dollar has also been the main currency used for foreign exchange trades and international trade
invoicing.1 Although this current arrangement is the joint outcome of choices made by private citi-
zens and regulations by official bodies, much of the existing international macroeconomic literature
treats payment arrangements as given by restricting agents to only using a particular currency.
While this assumption prevents the exchange rate from being indeterminate, as in Kareken and
Wallace (1981), such an approach is especially unsatisfactory if we want to understand the process
by which a currency achieves international status, or how it might lose that status. In particular,
what factors can cause the U.S. dollar to lose its international role? And what are the welfare
consequences of such an event?
The objective of this paper is to provide a simple framework for exploring both positive and
normative aspects of different international monetary systems. For that purpose, I develop an open-
economy search model with multiple currencies to analyze three central issues in international
economics: (i) the conditions under which a currency emerges as an international medium of
exchange, (ii) optimal monetary policy in an open economy, and (iii) the welfare benefits of having
an international currency for both the issuing country and the rest of the world. Search-theoretic
models are particularly insightful at addressing international currency use since they explicitly
formalize the essential role of money, rather than assuming it exogenously.2 In this spirit, this paper
differs from much of the international macro literature by letting agents choose which currencies
to accept, and not fixing its role by assumption. In turn, the model provides a tight link between
a currency’s international role and international trade.
The model features two key ingredients that capture the fact that international monetary
arrangements are the dual outcomes of choices made by private citizens and regulations by official
bodies. First, payment patterns are pinned down by letting private citizens choose which currencies
to accept. Before trades occur, sellers can acquire at some cost the information, or the technology,
1In addition to an international currency’s role as a store of value and medium of exchange in cross-border
transactions, which is the main focus of this paper, it can also serve as an anchor currency in exchange rate regimes;
a reserve currency in official foreign exchange reserves; a vehicle currency in foreign exchange; and an invoicing
currency in international trade. All these roles are correlated however and Goldberg (2011) finds that the U.S. dollar
maintains a dominant role in all key functions.
2A case in point is Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993) and Wright and Trejos (2001) which examines the
possible role for two fiat currencies in a two country world. However, restrictions on asset divisibility and portfolio
holdings prevent discussion of inflation and exchange rates. Recent works (e.g. Shi (1997) and Lagos and Wright
(2005)) have relaxed these restrictions; though without additional frictions, the theory predicts rate-of-return equality
across currencies and cannot pin down payments or exchange rates.
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in order to accept payment in a particular currency. Here, information costs simply reflect the
costly nature of dealing with multiple currencies or administering multi-payment economies. For
example, there are technological costs for installing new technologies, such as debit card devices;
or, it may be costly to verify asset quality if some currencies are not perfectly recognizable, as in
Kim (1996) and Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2012).3 Second, government transaction policies
are introduced in order to account for the fact that payment outcomes also reflect choices made by
official bodies. Historically, a currency will not become international unless there is a centralized
institution that favors its use. This is often achieved in practice by announcing legal tender status
or only accepting domestic money for tax payments.4 The basic idea is that by simply accepting a
particular currency in its own trades, governments may induce private agents to do the same.
In the baseline two-country, two-currency model, agents trade locally and internationally under
different market structures, as in Lagos and Wright (2005). The frictions in this environment are
decentralized exchanges, private trading histories, and imperfect recognizability of assets.5 Each
country issues one currency and is defined by two features: citizens in each country receive transfers
of domestic currency and meet each other more frequently than they meet foreigners. Trade entails
exchanging local goods for a portfolio of currencies, with no restrictions on which monies can be
used between private citizens. Since what sellers accept depend on what buyers hold, and vice
versa, complementarities in the trading environment lead to multiple equilibria where zero, one, or
two international monies can emerge. Network externalities can lead to coordination failures, with
no guarantee that the world will end up with a socially efficient monetary system.
By formalizing the role of currency in payments, the model provides a channel through which
monetary policy can affect prices, trade, and exchange rates. For example, currency substitution
occurs as an endogenous response to local inflation: as it becomes more costly to hold local money,
agents start substituting with foreign currency such as dollars. This captures the phenomenon
of dollarization common in many Latin American and Eastern European economies. The theory
also emphasizes an important influence on the choice of money as an international medium of ex-
change. Fundamentals, as well as expectations regarding other agents’ behavior, jointly determine
3History is rife with instances where means of payment have been subject to deceitful intent. The clipping of gold
and silver coins in medieval Europe and rampant production of fake banknotes in the 19th century U.S. are notable
examples, as documented in Mihm (2007) and discussed in Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012).
4The idea that what government accepts in payment affects what private agents do dates back to Smith (1963)
and Lerner (1947). For example, Lerner (1947) argued that “the modern state can make anything it chooses generally
acceptable as money... It is true that a simple declaration that such and such is money will not do... But if the
state is willing to accept the proposed money in payment of taxes and other obligations to itself the trick is done.”
Aiyagari and Wallace (1997) and Li and Wright (1998) provide the first formalization of this insight.
5A large literature that explores the link between recognizability, information, and liquidity include Brunner
and Meltzer (1971), Alchian (1977), Williamson and Wright (1994), Banerjee and Maskin (1996), Berensten and
Rocheteau (2004), Rocheteau (2011), Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012), and Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2012).
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this decision and thereby determine the circulation patterns that arise. Due to inertia, it is difficult
to dislodge an incumbent currency from its international role, whose use is associated with low
information costs. At the same time, a temporary disruption— such as a change in inflation— can
permanently shift payment patterns. International currency use therefore reflects both fundamen-
tals and history, consistent with what we observe in practice.6
This paper also explicitly models the strategic interaction among monetary authorities to ob-
tain insights on optimal monetary policy in interdependent economies. The dynamic policy game
captures the tradeoffs faced by policymakers and generates an inflation Laffer curve. While some
inflation can benefit the issuing country through increased seigniorage from foreigners, too much
inflation lowers the purchasing power of money hence trade between countries. At the same time,
the threat of losing international status puts an inflation discipline on the issuing country. When
monetary authorities interact in a simple policy game, the issuing country must therefore trade off
the temptation to inflate and the threat of losing international status to set an optimal inflation
rate that will generally deviate from the Friedman rule.
To illustrate these theoretical findings and quantify the welfare effects across countries, the
model is calibrated to match international trade data. The regions of interest consist of three trading
blocs: the United States, the Eurozone, and China. According to the theory, a country’s welfare can
be decomposed into seigniorage transfers across countries and the surplus due to liquidity provision
to citizens net of any information costs incurred. In turn, the model implies that for the U.S., the
welfare benefit of having the dollar as the sole international currency ranges from 1.3% to 2.1% of
GDP per year. For the Eurozone, the gain from having the euro as an international currency is
1.4% to 1.9% of GDP, compared with 0.4% of GDP from Portes and Rey (1998) which only include
seigniorage gains and the savings due to reduced transaction costs. This suggests that alternative
studies may be underestimating the benefit of international liquidity provision since these studies
do not take into account the general equilibrium effects an international currency has at expanding
trade opportunities abroad.
The study of international currencies with search theory follows a rich tradition. Earlier two-
country, two-currency search models with indivisible money include Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and
Matsui (1993), Zhou (1997), Wright and Trejos (2001), Camera and Winkler (2003), and Li and
Matsui (2009). However these models cannot address money growth, inflation, or currency sub-
stitution due to the assumption of indivisible money holdings. Two-country, two-currency search
6This paper provides microfoundations for insights first articulated by Menger (1892), Kindleberger (1967), Swo-
boda (1969), and Krugman (1980). In more recent work, Rey (2001), Devereux and Shi (2005), and Lyons and Moore
(2009) provide theories of vehicle currency use in foreign exchange markets, while Goldberg and Tille (2007) develop
a model of invoice currencies. In contrast, this paper emphasizes the medium-of-exchange role for international
currencies in cross-border goods transactions and derives this role using search theory.
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models following the Shi (1997) framework include Head and Shi (2003) and Liu and Shi (2010).7
In contrast with earlier dual-currency search models, this paper features divisible assets by
generalizing Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2012) to an open-economy setting. Although dol-
larization and exchange rates are discussed, the closed-economy setting prevents considerations of
international currencies and optimal monetary policy in an open economy. Another related work
is Geromichalos and Simonovska (2010), which attempts to reconcile the asset home bias puzzle.
However, fiat money is not modeled explicitly and the analysis abstracts from policy considerations.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the environment, and Section 3 defines
equilibrium. Currency regimes are characterized in Section 4, which also discusses how monetary
policy and government transaction policies affect prices, allocations, and welfare. Section 5 con-
siders a simple monetary policy game to determine optimal monetary policy in an open economy.
Section 6 calibrates the generalized model using international trade data, and Section 7 calculates
the welfare benefits of an international currency. Finally Section 8 concludes.
2 Environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. There are two countries, 1 and 2, populated with a contin-
uum of 2 and 2n agents, respectively, where n ∈ (0, 1) denotes relative country size. Each period
consists of two sub-periods where economic activity will differ. In the first, agents meet pairwise
and at random in decentralized markets (DM) of each country. Here, agents are evenly divided
between buyers and sellers: sellers from s = {1, 2} can produce output qs but do not want to
consume, while buyers want to consume but cannot produce. In the second sub-period, all trade
occurs in a frictionless competitive market (CM). All agents can consume a nume´raire good which
is produced according to a linear production function in labor. The supply of hours in the CM is
h which implies the real wage rate is equal to 1. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of events.
For tractability, instantaneous utilities are additively separable and quasi-linear in hours:
UB = u(qs) + U(x)− h,
US = −c(qs) + U(x)− h.
Functional forms for utilities and cost functions, u(q) and c(q), are assumed to be C2 with u′ > 0,
u′′ < 0, c′ > 0, c′′ > 0, u(0) = c(0) = c′(0) = 0, and U ′(0) = u′(0) =∞. Also, let q∗ ≡ {q : u′(q∗) =
c′(q∗)} and x∗ ∈ (0,∞) solve U ′(x∗) = 1. All goods are perishable, and agents discount the future
7There are also one-country models that study currency substitution and dollarization, such as Engineer (2000),
Peterson (2001), Ravikumar and Wallace (2002), Curtis and Waller (2003), and Camera, Craig, and Waller (2004).
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Figure 1: Timing of Representative Period
between periods with a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). Since individual histories are private information
in the DM, credit cannot be used, and a medium of exchange is essential for trade.
Each country issues its own fiat currency, c = {1, 2}, both perfectly divisible and storable.
Currency mc ∈ R+ is valued at φc, the price of money in terms of the nume´raire. The nominal
exchange rate is defined here to be the price of currency 2 in terms of currency 1: e ≡ φ2φ1 . Money
supplies, Mc, grow or shrink each period at a constant rate (γc − 1), where γc ≡ M
′
c
Mc
. I focus on
a stationary equilibrium where aggregate real balances in each country are constant. Therefore,
the rate of return of currency c in each country is constant and will equal γc =
φ
φ′ . Changes in
the money supply are implemented through lump-sum monetary transfers or taxes of domestic
currency in the CM to that country’s buyers. Since market clearing in the CM implies that the
law of one price holds, agents can trade currencies at the market clearing rate. Hence, the CM also
functions as a foreign exchange market.
Agents meet pairwise and at random in the DM. Buyers are mobile while sellers are immobile.
With probability α ∈ [12 , 1], a buyer stays in his country of origin and with probability 1−α, visits
the foreign country. The number of matches in the DM of country j is given by the matching
function Mj ≡ M(Bj ,Sj) = BjSjBj+Sj , where Bj and Sj denotes the measures of buyers and sellers
in the DM of country j.8 In country 1, B1 = α + n(1 − α), S1 = 1, and a buyer meets a seller
8Berentsen, Rocheteau, and Shi (2007) specify a general version of this matching function (called the “additive-
matching-rate-technology”) that nests most matching technologies used in monetary search models.
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with probability a1 =
1
1+α+n(1−α) while in country 2, B2 = αn+ 1− α, S2 = n, and a buyer meets
a seller with probability a2 =
1
1+α+ 1−α
n
. Table 1 presents buyers’ meeting probabilities across all
meeting types.
Table 1: Buyer’s Meeting Probabilities
Seller from 1 Seller from 2
Buyer from 1 αa1 (1− α)a2
Buyer from 2 (1− α)a1 αa2
National and international trade frictions are controlled by the parameters n and α. Since
n ∈ (0, 1), international meeting probabilities differ across countries. α can be interpreted as
the degree of economic integration: as α → 12 , countries become more integrated and meeting a
foreigner is more likely, while α→ 1 corresponds to a closed economy where only locals trade.
Sellers in the model are further split between private sellers and government sellers, whose roles
will differ in the following way. While domestic currency is perfectly recognizable, it is difficult for
private sellers to verify the quality of foreign currency. In particular, they must incur a fixed flow
cost, ψs ≥ 0, in order to recognize and accept payment in foreign money. For example, firms must
invest in a verification device in order to authenticate genuine foreign notes from counterfeits. The
fixed cost is homogenous across sellers within a country but can differ across countries. It is common
knowledge in a match whether the seller has invested, and sellers do not accept currencies they do
not recognize.9 Hence trade occurs under full information, and both currencies are accepted if and
only if ψs is incurred.
10
Government sellers consume and produce just like private sellers and are subject to the same
constraints and matching technology, but have exogenous policies regarding what they accept as
payment. Governments that only accept its domestic currency is considered the baseline policy,
τ .11 Government behavior is modeled this way since the purpose is to make precise how the size
and influence of government affects realms of circulation and the set of equilibria. Given τ , terms
9For example, sellers will reject payment if it is costless to produce worthless counterfeits: if sellers accepted
unrecognizable currencies, buyers would just hand over counterfeits in each exchange. This assumption simplifies the
pricing mechanism, as discussed by Rocheteau (2008). In related work, Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012) allows the
production of fraudulent assets at some cost, which generates an endogenous liquidity constraint.
10Without this decision, the model would predict that the two currencies are perfect substitutes that circulate
at the same rate of return. Consequently, the composition of portfolios and the nominal exchange rate, e = φ2
φ1
, is
indeterminate, as in Kareken and Wallace (1981). This indeterminacy however is sensitive to the pricing mechanism.
An alternative approach such as the Zhu and Wallace (2007) solution that is efficient but treats domestic and foreign
currencies asymmetrically can determine the exchange rate, as demonstrated by Nosal and Rocheteau (2011).
11Most governments only accept their own local currency— for example, for payment of taxes— but there are a
few exceptions where governments specifically demand some payments in foreign currency when their own money has
not been well accepted in international markets (see e.g. McBride and Schuler (2012)).
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of trade are determined through the same pricing mechanism as with interactions with private
sellers.12
Table 2: Measures of Agents in Economy
Country 1 Country 2
Buyer 1 n
Private Seller 1− g1 n(1− g2)
Government g1 ng2
Total 2 2n
Table 2 summarizes the sizes and composition of the world economy. Agents are equally split
between buyers and sellers, each of size 1 and n in country 1 and 2, respectively. The fraction of
government sellers in each country, g1 ∈ [0, 1] and g2 ∈ [0, 1], can be interpreted as government size
or the degree of centralized control.13
3 Equilibrium
This section describes the equilibrium of the two-country, two-currency model.
3.1 Centralized Market (CM) Value Functions
In the centralized markets, a representative buyer of each country chooses consumption of the
nume´raire good x, labor h, and real balances to bring forward next period. Portfolios are expressed
in real terms: let z = (zi, zj) ≡ (φimi, φjmj) ∈ R2+ represent a buyer from i’s portfolio of domestic
currency i = {1, 2} and foreign currency j = {1, 2} 6= i. Variables with a prime denote next period’s
choices. Also let WBi (z) and V
B
i (z) denote buyers’ value functions in the CM and DM, respectively.
In the beginning of the CM, a representative buyer from country i = {1, 2} faces the following
maximization problem:
WBi (z) = max
x,h,z′∈R2+
{U(x)− h+ βV Bi (z′)} (1)
s.t. x+ φim
′
i + φjm
′
j = h+ zi + zj + Ti (2)
12An alternative is to use a mechanism-design approach similar to Calvalcanti and Wallace (1999) where in a
fraction of trades, the government chooses a trading mechanism to maximize the incentives to accumulate the domestic
currency, while the remaining trades with private sellers are determined using a pricing mechanism such as bargaining,
price posting, or competitive pricing.
13Another interpretation is to assume that governments in each country declares which currencies are legal tender.
As in Lotz and Rocheteau (2002), the coercive power of the state arises from its ability to monitor transactions. The
monitoring technology however is imperfect and governments can only observe a fraction g1, g2 ∈ [0, 1] of trades.
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Ti ≡ (γi − 1)φiMi. (3)
The portfolio taken into the next DM is z′ = (z′i, z
′
j) = (φ
′
im
′
i, φ
′
jm
′
j), while Ti is the lump-sum
transfer of domestic currency from the government (expressed in nume´raire goods). Notice that
because of quasi-linear preferences, Ti does not affect the buyer’s problem in the CM. Substituting
m′c =
z′c
φ′c
for currency c = {1, 2} into the budget constraint and then eliminating h yields14
WBi (z) = U(x
∗)− x∗ + zi + zj + Ti + max
z′∈R2+
{−γiz′i − γjz′j + βV Bi (z′)}. (4)
A buyer’s lifetime utility at the beginning of the CM is thus the sum of his net consumption in
the CM, real balances in domestic and foreign currency, the lump-sum transfer from the local
government, and the continuation value at the beginning of the next DM minus the investment in
real balances.
A few results from the CM value function are worth highlighting. First, WBi (z) is linear in
total wealth z = zi + zj : W
′
i (z) = 1. Second, there are no wealth effects since z
′ is independent
of z, which follows from the quasi-linearity of the utility function. Taking first-order conditions,
optimal money holdings must satisfy for each currency c = {1, 2}:
−γc + β∂V
B
i (z
′)
∂z′c
≤ 0,
and with equality if z′c > 0. Provided that DM value functions V Bi (z) are strictly concave, there
will generally be a unique portfolio that satisfies market clearing where all buyers in a country
demand the same real balances. A caveat is when the two currencies are perfect substitutes; in
that case, buyers can hold different portfolios but they will have the same total value.
I next specify the pricing mechanism in the DM, which will show that the terms of trade do
not depend on the seller’s portfolio. Consequently, sellers will choose to spend all real balances
accumulated in the previous DM. Since sellers have no strict incentive to carry real balances in the
DM, their CM value function can be written as WSi (z) = U(x
∗)− x∗ + zi + zj + βV Si (0, 0), which
is also linear in total wealth.
3.2 Terms of Trade
Terms of trade in the DM are determined according to Kalai (1977)’s proportional bargaining rule.
This pricing mechanism permits sellers to extract a constant fraction of the match surplus in order
14In order to ensure that h ≥ 0 in equilibrium, it just needs to be checked that x∗ ≥ φ1(m1−m′1)+φ2(m2−m′2)+Ti.
Alternatively, there may be an additional constraint h ∈ [0, h] but so long as it is not binding, h can be eliminated
to obtain (4).
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to recover some of their ex-ante investment.15 Under proportional bargaining, a buyer acquires
output in exchange for payment to the seller and receives a constant share, θ1−θ , of the seller’s
surplus, where θ ∈ (0, 1) measures the buyer’s bargaining power, and threat points are given by
continuation values. Let q,d (Q,D) denote output and payment in private (government) meetings.
Given the model specification, terms of trade will depend on buyers’ portfolios, private sellers’
acceptance strategy, and governments’ transaction policy. To apply the pricing mechanism, notice
that the surplus of a buyer who gets qs for payment ds to a private seller is u(qs) +W
B
i (z − ds)−
WBi (z) = u(qs)− ds, by the linearity of WBi . Similarly, the seller’s surplus is ds − c(qs).
Consider first a meeting between a buyer and a seller from s that only accepts domestic currency.
Under proportional bargaining, quantity traded qs and payment ds solves
maxq,d[u(qs)− ds] (5)
s.t. u(qs)− ds = θ
1− θ [ds − c(qs)] (6)
ds ≤ zs. (7)
The bargaining problem maximizes the buyer’s surplus, subject to each party receiving a constant
share of the match surplus, and a feasibility constraint (7) that says the buyer cannot transfer more
money than he has, which is just real balances in the seller’s domestic currency zs. Consequently,
the bargaining problem must satisfy
qs ∈ argmax θ[u(qs)− c(qs)]
s.t. (1− θ)u(qs) + θc(qs) ≤ zs.
Payment to the sellers is thus z(qs) ≡ θc(qs)+(1−θ)u(qs). The function z(qs) is continuous, which
will guarantee that there exists a solution to the buyer’s choice of real balances. As a result, output
qs solves
z(qs) = min{z(q∗), zs} (8)
where
z(qs) ≡ θc(qs) + (1− θ)u(qs). (9)
15Other pricing mechanisms can be used, such as the generalized Nash (1950) solution. Note however that if the
buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, sellers will have no incentive to incur the fixed cost to accept currencies since
they do not receive any surplus from trade. As discussed in Arouba, Rocheteau, and Waller (2007), proportional
bargaining does not suffer from a shortcoming of Nash bargaining that an agent can end up with a lower individual
surplus even if the size of the total surplus increases.
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The bargaining solution simply says that when zs ≥ z(q∗), the buyer has enough wealth to finance
purchase of the first-best q∗, and payment to the seller will be z(q∗) = θc(q∗) + (1− θ)u(q∗). When
zs < z(q
∗), the buyer just gives the seller what he has, zs, and gets in return qs < q∗.
When instead the seller accepts both currencies by incurring the fixed cost to recognize foreign
money, terms of trade will satisfy a similar problem as (5) – (6), but with the feasibility constraint
dbs ≤ z1 + z2 since the buyer can now pay with both currencies. In what follows, the superscript b
is used to distinguish variables when sellers accept both currencies. Consequently, payment to the
seller zbs and output q
b
s solves
z(qbs) = min{z(q∗), z1 + z2} (10)
where
z(qbs) ≡ θc(qbs) + (1− θ)u(qbs). (11)
Since terms of trade with government sellers follow the same bargaining protocol as with private
sellers, output in government meetings, Qs(τ), will satisfy similar expressions:
z(Qs(τ)) = min{z(Q∗), zs} (12)
where
z(Qs(τ)) ≡ θc(Qs(τ)) + (1− θ)u(Qs(τ)). (13)
3.3 Foreign Currency Acceptance Decision
Before matches are formed in the DM, private sellers can acquire at some cost the information,
or technology, in order to accept payment in foreign currency. This decision determines which
payment instruments are accepted: only domestic currency or both currencies.16 Seller’s strategies
are given by σs ∈ [0, 1], where σs = 0 if a seller from s = {1, 2} rejects payment in foreign currency
and σs = 1 if foreign currency is accepted. When σs ∈ (0, 1), both currencies are accepted in a
fraction of trades.
Given the bargaining solution, the seller’s expected payoff if he rejects payment in foreign
currency is
Πs ≡ (1− θ){λ1s[u(qs)− c(qs)] + λ2s[u(q̂s)− c(q̂s)]}
where λis denotes the probability that a private seller from s meets a buyer from i = {1, 2} and
16Due to the presence of government sellers that always accept local currency, there will be residual demand for
both currencies. Without government sellers, there may also be a strategy where private sellers only accept foreign
currency or reject payment altogether.
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(1 − θ) is the seller’s share in the trade surplus. In what follows, hatted variables will refer to a
buyer from country 2.
If instead the seller chooses to incur the fixed cost to accept foreign currency, his expected
payoff is
Πbs ≡ −ψs + (1− θ){λ1s[u(qbs)− c(qbs)] + λ2s[u(q̂bs)− c(q̂bs)]}.
The seller’s expected gain from accepting both currencies is therefore
∆s ≡ Πbs −Πs
= −ψs + (1− θ)
{
λ1s[S(q
b
s)− S(qs)] + λ2s[S(q̂bs)− S(q̂s)]
}
,
where S(qs) ≡ u(qs)− c(qs) is the total trade surplus.
Consequently, the seller will choose to invest if ∆s > 0 and not invest if ∆s < 0. When ∆s = 0,
sellers are indifferent and invest with an arbitrary probability. Optimal strategies σ = (σ1, σ2) must
therefore satisfy
σs =

1
∈ (0, 1)
0
if ∆s

>
=
<
0. (14)
3.4 Decentralized Markets (DM) Value Function
Given the bargaining solution, the DM value functions simplify greatly. Since the terms of trade
do not depend on sellers’ portfolios, the DM value function can be written solely in terms of the
buyer’s problem.
Consider a representative buyer from country i. Using the linearity of WBi (z) and the bargaining
solution, the DM value function simplifies to:
V Bi (z) = αai
{
(1− gi)θ[σiS(qbi ) + (1− σi)S(qi)] + giθS(Qi(τ))
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
buyer’s surplus in domestic meetings
+ (1− α)aj
{
(1− gj)θ[σjS(qbj) + (1− σj)S(qj)] + gjθS(Qj(τ))
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
buyer’s surplus in foreign meetings
+ zi + zj +W
B
i (0, 0).
The last three terms result from the linearity of WBi (z) and is the value of proceeding to the CM
with one’s portfolio intact. The value function with no government results when g1 = g2 = 0.
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Next, lead the DM value function forward by one period and substitute into the CM value
function to yield the buyer’s objective function. Letting the interest rate on an illiquid nominal
bond denominated in currency c be 1 + ic =
φc
φ′cβ
, the buyer’s optimal choice of real balances solve
max
z∈R2+
{ −i1z1 − i2z2︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of holding money
+αai
{
(1− gi)θ[σiS(qbi ) + (1− σi)S(qi)] + giθS(Qi(τ))
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
buyer’s surplus in domestic meetings
(15)
+(1− α)aj
{
(1− gj)θ[σjS(qbj) + (1− σj)S(qj)] + (1− gj)θS(Qj(τ))
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
buyer’s surplus in foreign meetings
.
Here ic =
φc
φ′cβ
−1 is the cost of holding currency c. The objective function simply says that a buyer
chooses a portfolio to maximize his expected surplus in domestic and foreign meetings, net of the
cost of holding currency. Since (15) is continuous and maximizes over a compact set, there is a
solution to the buyer’s problem. In Appendix A, I show that this maximization problem is strictly
jointly concave so long as i1 > 0 and i2 > 0. When c ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2} 6= c, country i’s
first-order conditions with respect to real balances in currency zc are:
− ic + αac(1− gc)θ
[
σcS
′(qbc)
dqbc
dzc
+ (1− σc)S′(qc)dqi
dzc
]
+ (1− α)aj(1− gj)θ
[
σjS
′(qbj)
dqbj
dzc
]
(16)
+αacgfθS
′(Qi(τ))
dQi(τ)
dzc
≤ 0
where
dqc
dzc
=
{
1
z′(qc) =
1
θc′(qc)+(1−θ)u′(qc) : zc < z(qc),
0 : otherwise,
dqbc
dzc
=
{
1
z′(qbc)
= 1
θc′(qbc)+(1−θ)u′(qbc) : z1 + z2 < z(q
b
c),
0 : otherwise,
dQc
dzc
=
{
1
p′(Qc(τ)) =
1
θc′(Qc(τ))+(1−θ)u′(Qc(τ)) : zc < z(Qc(τ))
0 : otherwise.
Condition (16) is satisfied with equality if zc > 0.
Definition 1. Given τ , a stationary monetary equilibrium is a list of quantities traded {qs, qbs, Qs(τ)},
sellers’ strategies σs, and real balances z ≡ (zi, zj) ∀ i, j, s = {1, 2}, i 6= j such that
1. {qs, qbs, Qz(τ)} ∈ R3+ solves the bargaining problem 8 – 13;
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2. σs ∈ [0, 1] solves sellers’ foreign currency acceptance decision 14;
3. z ≡ (zi, zj) ∈ R2+ solves buyers’ portfolio problem 15;
4. Money markets clear.
In a monetary equilibrium where both currencies are valued, z1 > 0 and z2 > 0, DM output
across all meetings must satisfy
i1 = αa1{(1− g1)[σ1L(qb1) + (1− σ1)L(q1)] + g1L(Q1(τ))}+ (1− α)a2(1− g2)[σ2L(qb2)] (17)
i2 = αa1(1− g1)[σ1L(qb1)] + {(1− α)a2(1− g2)[σ2L(qb2) + (1− σ2)L(q2)] + g2L(Q2(τ))} (18)
where
L(q) ≡ θ[u
′(q)− c′(q)]
θc′(q) + (1− θ)u′(q) .
Buyers wish to bring currencies into the DM since these objects facilitate trade across different
meeting types, but doing so is costly as captured by the terms i1 and i2 on the left sides of (17)
and (18). The function L(q) is the liquidity premium and represents the marginal payoff an agent
gets from his liquid wealth that can be used to acquire more output in the DM instead of carrying
it over to the subsequent CM. Intuitively, the equilibrium conditions equate the marginal benefit
of liquidity to its cost. As a result, a currency demands a liquidity premium only if it is accepted
in trade, as determined by σ and τ . When no sellers accept a currency, it will not be valued. Also
notice that L(q) is strictly decreasing over the relevant range: that is, L′(q) < 0 for qk ∈ [0, q∗].17
In what follows, the focus is on equilibria where γc ≥ β, since there is no solution otherwise.
The following lemma summarizes some basic properties of optimal portfolio holdings.
Lemma 1. Consider any stationary monetary equilibrium where i1 6= i2 (currencies are not perfect
substitutes).
1. All buyers from the same country hold the same portfolios.
2. Buyers from different countries will generally hold different portfolios.
3. When there are no asymmetries in meeting arrangements— i.e., when the economy is perfectly
integrated (α = 12) and countries and governments are of equal sizes (n = 1, g1 = g2)— then
all buyers, irrespective of country origin, will hold the same portfolios.
17Differentiating L(q) = θ[u
′(q)−c′(q)]
θc′(q)+(1−θ)u′(q) yields L
′(q) = θ[u
′′(q)c′(q)−u′(q)c′′(q)]
[θc′(q)+(1−θ)u′(q)]3 < 0, given the assumptions on the
concavity of u(q) and convexity of c(q). Since the same conditions that make L′(q) < 0 make V Bi (z) strictly concave,
this ensures a unique stationary monetary equilibrium that solves the first order conditions.
13
Table 3: Equilibrium Currency Regimes
Regime σ Circulation Pattern
N (0, 0) Two National Currencies
I1 (0, σ2) Currency 1 is International and Currency 2 is National
I2 (σ1, 0) Currency 2 is International and Currency 1 is National
U (1, 1) Two International Currencies
Proof. Part (1) of Lemma 1 can be verified by examining the buyer’s maximization problem. Due
to the strict concavity of the objective, each buyer from a particular country has a degenerate
demand for both currencies. Parts (2) and (3) follow directly from inspection of equations (17)
and (18) and the bargaining solution. 
The intuition of Lemma 1 is that buyers from different countries hold different portfolios due
to the asymmetry in the matching process: since the probability of meeting a foreigner generally
depends on one’s nationality, buyers allocate portfolio weights accordingly. Without any asymmetry
in meeting arrangements, then buyers’ nationalities cease to matter and will all hold symmetric
portfolios. Given the model specification, this requires that n = 1, g1 = g2, and α =
1
2 , which
implies that it is equally likely to meet compatriots as foreigners.
Finally to close the model, market clearing implies that for each currency, aggregate supply
must equal aggregate demand. By Lemma 1, all buyers from the same country hold the same
portfolio when currencies are not perfect substitutes. Total demand for money 1 is 2m1 + 2nm̂1
and for money 2 is 2m2 + 2nm̂2. Market clearing then implies
2m1 + 2nm̂1 = M1, (19)
2m2 + 2nm̂2 = M2. (20)
4 Currency Regimes
Having defined monetary equilibrium, I now examine the types of currency regimes that arise in
the dual-currency economy. Given government transaction policies under τ , a currency regime is
defined as a pair of strategies for private sellers, σ ≡ (σ1, σ2), that satisfies their currency acceptance
decision. The focus is on the most representative monetary regimes: local circulation of currencies
and international circulation of one or both currencies. Table 3 summarizes the currency regimes
discussed in the text. In the following, the implications and existence of these types of equilibria
are discussed.
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4.1 Regime N: Two National Currencies
Consider first a regime where sellers only accept their domestic currency; that is, σ = (0, 0).
Suppose that country 1 is the U.S. and country 2 is Mexico. Given the government policy τ , this
gives rise to the emergence of two national currencies: dollars are only accepted in the United
States and pesos only accepted in Mexico.18 This coincides with a common assumption in many
international macroeconomic models, though arises as an equilibrium outcome in this model.
Under τ , output in country 1 must satisfy
i1 = αa1L(q1)
i2 = (1− α)a2L(q2)
since output in government meetings will be the same as in private meetings (similar equations
can be derived for country 2). The equations above relate the demand by agents from different
countries for the two currencies to the cost of holding it. Since DM quantities in each meeting type
can be obtained independently from these equations, monetary policies are independent across
countries. Real balances can then be obtained from the bargaining solution: z(q1) = φ1m1 > 0 and
z(q2) = φ2m2 > 0.
Necessary conditions for the two currencies to admit interior solutions are i1 < i1 ≡ αa1 θ1−θ
and i2 < i2 ≡ (1− α)a2 θ1−θ . Buyers must have enough bargaining power in order for currencies to
be valued. Hence even with the presence of government sellers that always accept local currency,
there may be a non-monetary equilibrium where neither currencies are valued if i1 > i1 or i2 > i2.
So long as i1 < i1 and i2 < i2, buyers hold positive balances of both monies, since each have
exchange roles in the issuing country.19 Neither currency is fundamentally priced since each is
essential for some meetings, even if one is being issued at a higher rate and thus has a higher
inflation rate. Hence low-return currencies can circulate in equilibrium despite the existence of a
18National-currency equilibria are difficult to obtain in earlier dual-currency search models with indivisible money
and divisible goods, as pointed out by Yiting Li. To obtain such an equilibrium, Wright and Trejos (2001) must assume
that sellers cannot recognize the nationality of the buyer, but only the nationality of the currency the buyer carries.
Without this assumption, there are no frictions for sellers to reject foreign money and hence national currencies
cannot exist.
19A buyer from the U.S. holds both monies since they may meet a Mexican that only accepts pesos, which generates a
precautionary demand for foreign currency. Since this allows trade to occur between agents from different countries—
though only the seller’s domestic currency changes hands— this differs from the “autarky” regime discussed in
Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993). In the present model, only in a closed economy (α = 1) will there be no
international trade and hence no precautionary demand for foreign currency. In Appendix B, I consider an alternative
formalization of the model where buyers know with whom they will be matched with before making portfolio decisions.
In that case, there is no longer a precautionary demand for foreign currency. Moreover, the set of equilibria from the
baseline model are preserved in this alternative specification.
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competing, higher-return currency. Since sellers only accept their domestic money, only national
currencies change hands. Equilibrium money holdings can then be obtained through the market-
clearing conditions, 2m1 + 2nm̂1 = M1 and 2m2 + 2nm̂2 = M2.
Since both currencies can be valued at potentially different rates of return, the nominal exchange
rate, e ≡ φ2φ1 , is determinate and will equal
e =
z(q̂1) + nz(q̂2)
z(q1) + nz(q2)
M1
M2
.
As expected, the exchange rate depends on fundamentals and monetary factors in the two countries.
For example, if the U.S. increases its money supply then dollars depreciate relative to pesos. The
exchange rate is also affected by search frictions through dependence on q.
Turning to existence, this regime will constitute an equilibrium so long as private sellers have
no incentive to incur the cost to recognize the foreign currency. This is true if Πs > Π
b
s, or ∆s < 0
∀s = {1, 2}, which is satisfied when ψ1 and ψ2 are sufficiently large:
ψ1 > ψ1 ≡ (1− θ){λ11[S(qb1)− S(q1)] + λ21[S(q̂b1)− S(q̂1)]},
ψ2 > ψ2 ≡ (1− θ){λ12[S(qb2)− S(q2)] + λ22[S(q̂b2)− S(q̂2)]},
where qbs is a solution to 17 and 18.
Government transaction policies can also guarantee this outcome. Using the identity µijBi =
λijSj to derive meeting probabilities for private sellers yields λ11 = αa˜1(1 − g1), λ21 = (1 −
α)a˜1(1 − g1), λ12 = (1 − α)a˜2(1 − g2), and λ22 = αa˜2(1 − g2),where a˜1 = [1 + 1α+n(1−α) ]−1 and
a˜2 = [1+
n
αn+1−α ]
−1. Inserting sellers’ meeting probabilities and rearranging equilibrium conditions
∆1 < 0 and ∆2 < 0 yields
g1 > g1 ≡ 1−
ψ1
(1− θ)a˜1{α[S(qb1)− S(q1)] + (1− α)[S(q̂b1)− S(q̂1)]}
,
g2 > g2 ≡ 1−
ψ2
(1− θ)a˜2{α[S(q̂b2)− S(q̂2)] + (1− α)[S(q̂b2)− S(q̂2)]}
.
As long as both currencies are valued, g1 > g1 and g2 > g2 ensures that an equilibrium with
national currencies will exist. The presence of large national governments that only accept local
money can therefore induce private citizens to do the same.
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4.2 Regime I1: Currency 1 is International and Currency 2 is National
This class of equilibria corresponds to the emergence of an international currency that circulates
both locally and abroad. Within this class, there will be an equilibrium in pure strategies where all
U.S. sellers reject pesos while all Mexican sellers accept both dollars and pesos: (σ1, σ2) = (0, 1).
There can also be a mixed equilibrium where Mexican sellers randomize: (σ1, σ2) = (0,Φ), where
Φ ∈ (0, 1). As a result, the dollar becomes an international currency while pesos only circulate
locally.20
Under τ , output in country 1 must satisfy
i1 = αa1L(q1) + (1− α)a2(1− g2)σ2L(qb2),
i2 = (1− α)a2{(1− g2)[σ2L(qb2) + (1− σ2)L(q2)] + g2L(q2)}.
In this case, buyers hold positive balances of the two monies: z(q1) = φ1m1, z(q
b
2) = φ1m1 +φ2m2,
z(q2) = φ2m2. The following table summarizes the effects of inflation and monetary policy in the
two countries.21
∂φ1
∂i1
< 0 ∂φ2∂i1 > 0
∂e
∂i1
> 0
∂φ1
∂i2
> 0 ∂φ2∂i2 < 0
∂e
∂i2
< 0
If γ2 increases, the peso inflates, which decreases its value, φ2. This also raises the value of
dollars, φ1. The exchange rate e =
φ2
φ1
falls and dollars appreciate due to increased foreign demand.
Intuitively, as domestic inflation increases, locals in Mexico economize on peso holdings, which
reduces its price φ2. Since there’s less demand for pesos, agents substitute into dollars, which raises
its price φ1. Now that the dollar is more valuable, sellers have more incentive to accept it. As a
result, the economy dollarizes. This is due to the model’s general equilibrium effects that makes
currency substitution an endogenous response to local inflation. This situation arises precisely in
dollarized economies where high inflation makes transacting in the local currency more costly so
that citizens instead adopt the U.S. dollar.22
Figures 2 illustrates the effect of inflation on uniqueness or multiplicity. Consider a Mexican
seller’s decision to accept both currencies rather than just pesos. When peso inflation is low, the
benefit of adopting an additional medium of exchange is also low. As monetary policy approaches
the Friedman rule i2 → 0, output approaches q∗, the expected benefit of acquiring information
20Another equilibrium, (σ1, σ2) = {(1, 0), (Φ, 0)} has symmetric properties as this regime, so discussion is omitted.
21To obtain these comparative statics, I first differentiate the Euler equations with respect to i1 or i2 then differ-
entiate the bargaining solution for the final expression. These calculations are provided in Appendix A.
22This result is also discussed in Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2012) with a fixed one-time cost in a closed-
economy setting.
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Figure 2: Monetary Policy and Inflation
∆2 gets small, and there is an equilibrium where sellers do not accept foreign money so that
economy ends up in regime N . As inflation increases however, it becomes more costly to use the
national money, which decreases φ2 and increases the value of the alternative asset, φ1. This raises
the incentive to acquire information and can generate multiple circulation patterns. As a result,
currency substitution may be a purely expectational phenomenon: an international money may
emerge even if the fundamentals of the economy are consistent with an equilibrium with national
currency use. Historical episodes of dollarization in response to high inflation support this idea.23
Figure 2 also shows how the government policy variable, g2, affects circulation patterns. Only
in the limiting case where g2 = 1 does the equilibrium where currency 1 is international cease
to exist. For g2 < 1, legal tender laws are therefore insufficient to rule out circulation of foreign
currency. The non-monetary equilibrium when i2 > i2 therefore exists even when enforcement is at
its maximum, g2 = 1. Figure 2 also illustrates the possibility that a local currency may survive and
coexist with an international medium of exchange even without government restrictions (g2 = 0),
as in Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993). More generally, changes in government size will
have direct effects on currency values, thereby influencing the monetary equilibrium attained.
In this model, an international currency emerges due to sellers’ acceptance decisions and be-
23Currency substitution typically arises under high inflation, where the use of foreign currency persists after it
has been accepted. For example, dollarization in many Latin American and Asian countries continue even after
inflation stabilization, consistent with the model’s predictions. Oomes (2001) documents that dollarization in Russia
increased from almost zero to over 70% in the 1990’s and failed to decrease despite stabilization. Similarly, Guidotti
and Rodriguez (1992) report that dollarization in Bolivia went from close to zero in 1985 to nearly 50% in 1987.
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Figure 3: Sellers’ Strategies and Multiplicity
comes valued when a subset of sellers get informed about both currencies. An equilibrium where
currency 1 becomes international requires Π1 > Π
b
1 and Π2 ≤ Πb2, which implies that the fixed cost
is sufficiently large in country 1 while sufficiently low in country 2:
ψ1 > ψ1 ≡ (1− θ){αa˜1[S(qb1)− S(q1)] + (1− α)a˜1[S(q̂b1)− S(q̂1)]},
ψ2 ≤ ψ˜2 ≡ (1− θ){(1− α)a˜2[S(qb2)− S(q2)] + αa˜2[S(q̂b2)− S(q̂2)]}.
For both currencies to be accepted, the flow cost for country 2 sellers must be less than the increase
in their expected surplus associated with accepting both currencies. Figure 3 depicts the strategy
of a country 2 seller as a function of the fixed cost, ψ2, and the measure of country 2 sellers that
accept both currencies, σ2. Since the two horizontal lines overlap for intermediate values of ψ2,
there can be multiple equilibria where regimes N and I1 coexist.
24
At the same time, an equilibrium where the dollar is international will exist if government in
the issuing country is sufficiently large while sufficiently small in the other country:
g1 > g1 ≡ 1−
ψ1
(1− θ)a˜1{α[S(qb1)− S(q1)] + (1− α)[S(q̂b1)− S(q̂1)]}
,
24Figure 3 also shows that the mixed strategy equilibrium with σ2 = Φ ∈ (0, 1) can deliver a counter-intuitive result
that an increase in the cost of accepting dollars can increase the fraction of sellers that accept it. The mixed strategy
equilibrium is also unstable in the following sense. When an equilibrium with σ2 = Φ is changed to σ
′
2 = Φ + ,
where  > 0 is arbitrarily small, it is a best response for all sellers from country 2 to invest, leading to an equilibrium
with σ2 = 1. This instability however is not robust to a more general formalization of the seller’s information cost.
For example, if costs are heterogenous across sellers from a given country, then mixed strategy equilibria need not be
unstable in the sense described above.
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g2 ≤ g˜2 ≡ 1− ψ2
(1− θ)a˜2{α[S(q̂b2)− S(q̂2)] + (1− α)[S(qb2)− S(q2)]}
.
Since dollars circulates abroad, the Mexican government may want to consider using its transaction
policy to drive dollars out of circulation in its country. For this to occur, it must be that Mexican
sellers no longer find it optimal to accept dollars. This requires that g2 > g˜2, in which case a
sufficiently large local government can de-dollarize the economy by inducing a switch to national
currency use. If instead g2 ≤ g˜2, then the government can only encourage and promote its currency,
but cannot guarantee that the other stops circulating.
4.3 Regime U: Two International Currencies
Now consider an equilibrium where all sellers accept both currencies, σ = (1, 1), leading to the
emergence of two international currencies.25
Since the bargaining solution implies that qb1 = q
b
2 ≡ qb, equilibrium conditions simplify to
i1 = [αa1(1− g1) + (1− α)a2(1− g2)]L(qb) + αa1g1L(q1)
i2 = [αa1(1− g1) + (1− α)a2(1− g2)]L(qb) + (1− α)a2g2L(q2).
First notice that when there is no government (g1 = g2 = 0), for both monies to be valued, it
must be that
i1 = i2.
Hence the two currencies are equally liquid and are valued only if they have the same rate of return.
As in Kareken and Wallace (1981), citizens are indifferent between currencies with equal returns,
so that the two are perfect substitutes. When monies circulate at par, agents may hold different
portfolios, but they will have the same total value: z(qb) = φ1m1 +φ2m2, where real balances must
satisfy the market-clearing conditions 2m1 + 2nm̂1 = M1 and 2m2 + 2nm̂2 = M2.
Further, the exchange rate is indeterminate since qb is uniquely determined while M1 and M2
must satisfy a single condition.26 To see this when γ1 = γ2 = γ, let the world money supply in φ1
units be M = M1 + eM2, growing at constant rate γ, where e =
φ2
φ1
> 0. A representative citizen’s
currency portfolio is constant: z˜(qb) = φ1M1 + φ2M2. Since this is constant, φ1 and φ2 must be
25There is also an equilibrium where sellers in both countries randomize, σ = (Φ1,Φ2), where Φs denotes the
fraction of sellers in country s = {1, 2} that accept both currencies. In this case, equilibrium conditions will be given
by (17) and (18), with σ1 = Φ1 and σ2 = Φ2. In general, the two monies need not be perfect substitutes.
26There will be exchange rate indeterminacy when there is a subset of agents who view the two monies as perfect
substitutes. While this subset pertains to the fraction of private sellers in this model, King, Wallace, and Weber
(1992) provide an early analog of this idea by introducing a group of international currency traders that interact with
agents that must satisfy cash-in-advance constraints.
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decreasing at rate γ. As both e and φ1 must satisfy a single condition z˜(q
b) = φ1[M1 + eM2], there
will be indeterminacy: there can exist equilibria where only one currency is valued and equilibria
where both currencies are valued.
While in Kareken and Wallace (1981) the nominal exchange rate is everywhere indeterminate,
this will not be the case in this model. In particular, the model’s fixed costs for recognizing
foreign currency constrains the indeterminacy. If the costs, ψ1 and ψ2, are large enough so that
no sellers accept both, there is no longer an equilibrium where the two currencies circulate at
par.27 Conversely, an equilibrium where all private sellers accept both currencies exists if Πbs > Πs
∀s = {1, 2}, which implies that the fixed cost in both countries must be sufficiently low:
ψ1 < ψ˜1 ≡ (1− θ)(1− g1){αa˜1[S(qb1)− S(q1)] + (1− α)a˜1[S(q̂b1)− S(q̂1)]},
ψ2 < ψ˜2 ≡ (1− θ)(1− g1){(1− α)a˜2[S(qb2)− S(q2)] + αa˜2[S(q̂b2)− S(q̂2)]}.
While the first-best level of output qb = q∗ is achieved under the Friedman Rule, this is not socially
efficient since all sellers must incur a real cost ψ1 > 0 and ψ2 > 0.
Alternatively, the existence of national governments can also rule out indeterminacy. An equilib-
rium where both currencies are accepted by all sellers exists if national governments are sufficiently
small:
g1 < g˜1 ≡ 1− ψ1
(1− θ)a˜1{α[S(qb1)− S(q1)] + (1− α)[S(q̂b1)− S(q̂1)]}
,
g2 < g˜2 ≡ 1− ψ2
(1− θ)a˜2{α[S(q̂b2)− S(q̂2)] + (1− α)[S(qb2)− S(q2)]}
.
Consequently, another way to eliminate indeterminacy in this model is by having large enough
governments that adopt transaction policies so that currencies no longer circulate at par.
4.4 Multiple Equilibria
As shown in the previous subsections, the model implies the emergence of distinct currency regimes
characterized by different payment patterns and realms of circulation. There can be multiple
equilibria, where the share of transactions requiring different currencies is not uniquely determined
by fundamentals. Proposition 1 summarizes how the information cost parameter affects multiplicity.
Proposition 1. Consider a stationary monetary equilibrium where both currencies are valued.
1. If ψ2 < ψ˜2, then there will be an equilibrium where sellers from 2 only accept local currency
27In an overlapping generations monetary model, Martin (2006) derives an analogous result and rules out indeter-
minacy of the exchange rate by similarly assuming a fixed cost for sellers to accept two currencies.
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Figure 4: Existence of Equilibria in (ψ1, ψ2)-Space
and an equilibrium where they accept both currencies for any ψ2 ∈ [ψ2, ψ˜2] since conditions
∆2 < 0 and ∆2 > 0 can be simultaneously satisfied.
2. If ψ1 < ψ˜1, then there will be an equilibrium where sellers from 1 only accept local currency
and an equilibrium where they accept both currencies for any ψ1 ∈ [ψ1, ψ˜1] since existence
conditions ∆1 < 0 and ∆1 > 0 can be simultaneously satisfied.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 4, which depicts the typology of equilibria in the informa-
tion space, (ψ1, ψ2), assuming the same money growth rate in the two countries. Figure 4 shows
that there are regions in the parameter space where regimes exist uniquely, if information costs are
sufficiently low or high, and regions where regimes coexist.
The intuition for multiplicity operates through the general equilibrium interaction between
buyers and sellers: what sellers accept depend on what buyers carry, and what buyers carry depend
on what sellers accept. When more sellers accept a currency, it becomes more liquid and thus more
valuable in exchange. Since buyers now want to hold more of this currency, its price increases, which
increases the incentives for sellers to accept it. Due to this complementarity, multiple equilibria can
arise. Consequently, the regime that the economy ends up in will depend on both fundamentals
and expectations.
This multiplicity is also present in Figure 5, which depicts the existence of equilibria as a
function of the two country’s money growth rates, (γ1, γ2)-space, assuming that information costs
are neither sufficiently high nor low so that Regimes N , I1, I2, and U are all possible.
An equilibrium with national currencies (Regime N) exists so long as neither currency is too
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Figure 5: Existence of Equilibria in (γ1, γ2)-Space
costly to hold. Both currencies will be valued and sellers only accept domestic currency so long as
γ1 < γ1 and γ2 < γ2. An equilibrium where currency 1 is international while currency 2 is only
locally accepted (Regime I1) exists so long as γ1 < γ˜1— the rate of return on currency 1 is high
enough in order to give sellers from 2 enough incentive to accept currency 1. Symmetrically, an
equilibrium where currency 2 is international while currency 1 is only locally accepted (Regime I2)
exists so long as γ2 < γ˜2. An equilibrium where sellers accept both currencies (Regime U) exists
as a knife-edge case on the 45-degree line where there is rate of return equality. In that case, the
currencies become perfect substitutes and the exchange rate is indeterminate. Finally, there can
be a unique non-monetary equilibrium where either one or both currencies are not valued if monies
are too costly to hold, which occurs when γ1 > γ1 or γ2 > γ2.
4.5 Welfare
This section concludes with a discussion of the model’s normative implications. Due to the existence
of multiple equilibria, countries may prefer one type of payment regime to another. Welfare in
country i ∈ {1, 2} is defined as the steady-state sum of buyers’ and sellers’ utilities in country i,
weighted by their respective measures in the DM, Bi and Si:
Wi = Bi(1− β)V Bi (z1, z2) + Si(1− β)V Si (0, 0).
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Net consumption in the CM, U(x∗) − x∗, is normalized to zero with no loss in generality. In
Appendix A, I show that welfare can be written as
Wi = BiTi + αMi {(1− gi)[σiS(qbi ) + (1− σi)S(qi)] + giS(Qi(τ))}︸ ︷︷ ︸
total surplus in domestic meetings
+ (1− α)Mj θ{(1− gj)[σjS(qbj) + (1− σj)S(qj)] + gjS(Qj(τ))}︸ ︷︷ ︸
buyer i’s surplus in foreign meetings
+ (1− α)Mi (1− θ){(1− gi)[σiS(qbi ) + (1− σi)S(qi)] + giS(Qi(τ))}︸ ︷︷ ︸
seller i’s surplus in foreign meetings
−Siσiψi,
where
T1 ≡ nφ1(m̂′1 − m̂1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
country 1’s seigniorage revenue from country 2
− φ2(m′2 −m2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
country 1’s seigniorage transfer to country 2
, (21)
T2 ≡ φ2(m′2 −m2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
country 2’s seigniorage revenue from country 1
− nφ1(m̂′1 − m̂1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
country 2’s seigniorage transfer to country 1
. (22)
As a result, welfare can be decomposed into two components: (i) net seigniorage revenues or
transfers given by Ti, and (ii) surplus in DM trades net of information costs. In all equilibria where
both currencies are valued, T1 6= 0 and T2 6= 0, with T1 + T2 = 0 due to market-clearing. Hence
each monetary authority is also subject to its budget constraint Ti = φi(M
′
i −Mi), which says that
it finances lump-sum transfer to buyers through increases in the money supply.
According to the theory, there are two distinct sources of the welfare benefits of having an
international currency. First is the increase in welfare due to increased seigniorage that arises from
increased demand for real balances by foreigners. Second is the change in welfare due to increased
trade. When a currency becomes international, it is more widely used in facilitating transactions
which expands international trade.
Consequently, the model implies that welfare is unambiguously higher for a country that suc-
cessfully has its currency accepted abroad than under a national currency regime. This gain comes
from two sources: seigniorage gains from foreigners and an expansion of trade opportunities. How-
ever whether the other country also benefits from foreign currency circulation is ambiguous and
depends on the benefit from increased international trade and the cost of lost seigniorage and the
cost of accepting foreign money. These tradeoffs will be especially important in the next section
which considers a simple monetary policy game to determine the optimal choice of inflation in the
dual-currency economy.
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5 A Simple Monetary Policy Game
In this section, I analyze the strategic choices of monetary authorities by modeling their objective
functions and specifying the rules of their strategic interaction.28 In the baseline analysis, monetary
authorities behave non-cooperatively and determine the optimal monetary policy for their country
by choosing a money growth rate to maximize the welfare of its citizens, taking as given the other
country’s money growth rate. In turn, each monetary authority is able to affect the rate of return
of its currency and hence impact welfare both at home and abroad. Since the economy is open
and policymakers behave strategically, optimal monetary policy in one country depends not only
on domestic transaction patterns, but also on choices made by foreign citizens and the foreign
policymaker. As a result, the policymaker may generate an externality for the other country that
leads optimal policy to deviate from the Friedman rule.
5.1 Non-Cooperative Policy
The analysis begins by representing the strategic choices of monetary authorities as a one-shot
non-cooperative game with perfect information. The analysis abstracts from repeated interactions
among the monetary authorities since allowing for trigger strategies would substantially enlarge
the set of equilibria.
There are three sets of players: citizens and the monetary authorities in countries 1 and 2.
The game is divided into two stages. In the first stage, the monetary authority from each country
i = {1, 2} chooses a money growth rate γi ∈ [β,∞) to maximize the welfare of its citizens, taking
as given the money growth rate chosen by the other country, j = {1, 2} 6= i, and optimal choices
by citizens. Monetary authorities commit to their policy and choose their policies simultaneously
and once-and-for-all.29 In the second stage, citizens observe the actions of monetary authorities
and make their currency acceptance decision, settle terms of trade, and select portfolio holdings.
The focus is on finding subgame perfect equilibria of the policy game.
Definition 2. A subgame perfect equilibrium consists of money growth rates for monetary author-
ities, (γ∗1 , γ∗2), and best response functions for agents, Θ∗(γ1, γ2) such that
1. For any given action taken by monetary authorities, agents’ optimal choices, Θ∗(γ1, γ2) ≡
28Policy games in two-country, two-currency search models with indivisible money include Trejos and Wright (1996),
Trejos (2003), and Li and Matsui (2009). However due to restrictions on portfolio holdings, these frameworks cannot
be used to to analyze policymakers’ choice of inflation. Liu and Shi (2010) consider optimal monetary policy with
two symmetric currency areas but focuses on the deviations from the law of one price.
29Here, commitment is defined as the ability of an authority to bind future policy choices. Although this assumption
can be restrictive, the purpose of this analysis is to establish as a benchmark the choice of optimal policies in the
limiting case where policymakers can commit.
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{(qs, qbs, Qs(τ)), (zi, zj), σs} ∈ R3+ × R2+ × [0, 1], satisfy Definition 1 for all i, j, s ∈ {1, 2},
i 6= j.
2. Monetary authority i ∈ {1, 2} chooses a money growth rate, γ∗i ∈ [β,∞), that maximizes
welfare for its citizens, Wi, taking as given γ∗j for j ∈ {1, 2} 6= i and Θ∗(γ1, γ2):
γ∗1 ∈ argmax W1(γ1, γ∗2 ,Θ∗(γ1, γ∗2)),
γ∗2 ∈ argmax W2(γ∗1 , γ2,Θ∗(γ∗1 , γ2)).
The game is solved using backwards induction, starting with the choices made by citizens.
Section 4 solved for these optimal choices by characterizing the currency regimes that emerge,
which forms the Nash equilibria of the final subgame. Throughout this section, it is assumed that
government sellers only accept domestic currency.
Monetary Authorities’ Choice of (γ∗1 , γ∗2)
In the first stage, monetary authorities select optimal policies to maximize welfare for its country,
anticipating that citizens respond optimally with Θ∗(γ1, γ2).
First, I show that monetary authorities can increase welfare by deviating from the Friedman
rule, which is the typical optimal policy in single-currency economies without entry externalities.
This implies that the Friedman rule need not be an optimal policy in the current set-up. Next I
establish existence of subgame perfect money growth rates for a given equilibrium selection mecha-
nism that places some continuity on agents’ beliefs in parameter regions with multiplicity. Finally,
I construct numerical examples to illustrate the main tradeoffs at hand.
Proposition 2. Suppose country j fixes its money growth rate at the Friedman rule, γj = β.
Country i 6= j can benefit by setting its money growth rate above the Friedman rule, γi > β, so long
as the economy is open (α < 1) and there is foreign demand for currency i. That is, dWidγi
∣∣
γi=β
> 0.
In an open economy, both countries have an incentive to inflate above the Friedman rule if
the other country follows the Friedman rule. Since a country can export inflation abroad when
foreigners hold its currency, seigniorage becomes a motive for money issue. This temptation to
inflate is all the more striking since the monetary authority can resort to lump-sum taxes and
does not have any expenditures of its own. As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012), the incentive
to deviate from the Friedman rule is not simply to finance its budget with seigniorage revenue
extracted from foreigners. Rather, the monetary authority imposes an inflation tax on foreigners
to increase the total amount of resources available to domestic residents for private consumption.
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Further, the Friedman rule can only be the optimal policy if Ti = 0. This would be the case
in a closed-economy with α = 1 and all sellers only accept domestic currency. Since there is only
demand for local currency, buyers no longer hold foreign money and hence neither country receives
seigniorage payments from the other country. This results in Ti = 0 and dWidγi
∣∣
γi=β
= 0. In that case,
inflating will just reduce the purchasing power of currency for its residents, which is the typical
distortion in single-currency economies.
Proposition 2 implies that when monetary authorities cannot cooperate and governments always
accept domestic currency, the Friedman rule is not the optimal policy. However, determining
equilibrium money growth rates requires examining the best response of one country’s money
growth rate to any arbitrarily given growth rate of the other country, not just the best response
to the Friedman rule. When the other country does not follow the Friedman rule, the policymaker
must trade off the positive effect of inflation with the negative effect that inflation has on reducing
the purchasing power of currency.
Moreover, establishing the existence of subgame perfect money growth rates requires taking
a stand on which equilibrium the economy converges to in regions where multiple regimes exist.
For that purpose, I introduce an equilibrium selection mechanism that places some continuity on
agents’ beliefs. I then show existence for the given equilibrium selection mechanism described.
Definition. Let γ˜ ≡ ζγ˜1 + (1 − ζ)γ˜2, where ζ ∈ [0, 1] is exogenous. The equilibrium selection
mechanism, G, says if γ1 < γ˜, regime Ω1 = {N, I1} prevails, and if γ1 > γ˜, then regime Ω2 = {N, I2}
prevails.
Figure 6: Equilibrium Selection: ζ ∈ [0, 0.5) Figure 7: Equilibrium Selection: ζ ∈ (0.5, 1]
The mechanism G simply introduces an arbitrary rule, γ˜, that is a weighted average of the
two curves in Figure 5, γ˜1 and γ˜2. Figures 6 and 7 plots the rule γ˜ for different values of ζ. For
example, one specification is that agents believe foreign currency is never accepted for all regions
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of the parameter space, in which case Ω1 = {N} and Ω2 = {N}. Another specification is that
agents believe currency 1 is international for all γ1 < γ˜ = γ˜1 while they believe foreign currency
is never accepted when γ1 > γ˜1, in which case ζ = 1, Ω1 = {I1}, and Ω2 = {N}. The purpose of
introducing this mechanism is to place some discipline and monotonicity on agents’ beliefs and is
not meant to provide ad-hoc microfoundations for how beliefs are actually formed.
Proposition 3. Given G, there exists subgame perfect money growth rates and it is such that
γ1 > β and γ2 > β.
I now turn to numerical examples to illustrate the motives of monetary authorities under
different scenarios in the last subgame.
Case 1: Foreign Currency is Never Accepted
Consider first the case where agents reject payment in foreign currency for all values of (γ1, γ2).
That is, Ω1 = {N} and Ω2 = {N}. Since agents always adopt the trading strategy (σ1, σ2) = (0, 0),
the welfare function in each country is well-behaved, continuous, and concave. As an example,
Figure 8 plots welfare in country 1 as a function of its policy instrument γ1, for a given γ2. In what
follows, it is implicitly understood that all endogenous variables are indexed with the regime under
consideration. The two country’s welfare functions are symmetric in this equilibrium and can be
written as
Wi|N = BiTi + αMiS(qi) + (1− α)MjθS(qj) + (1− α)Mi(1− θ)S(q̂i),
where net seigniorage for the two countries are T1 = nφ1(m̂′1 − m̂1) − φ2(m′2 − m2) and T2 =
φ2(m
′
2 −m2)− nφ1(m̂′1 − m̂1). Policymakers then choose money growth rates, (γ1, γ2), that solves
the two country’s first-order conditions, ∂W1|N∂γ1 = 0 and
∂W2|N
∂γ2
= 0.
Country 1’s best response function can be obtained by solving ∂W1|N∂γ1 = 0 for their policy
instrument, γ1:
γ1 = BR1(γ1),
where BR1(γ1) ≡ 1− ẑ1z′(q̂1) implicitly depends on its own money growth rate, γ1, but is independent
of country 2’s policy instrument, γ2. This is because when only local currency is accepted, the
amount of output traded in one country is determined independently of the amount of traded in
the other country. Similarly, country 2’s best response function is
γ2 = BR2(γ2),
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where BR2(γ2) ≡ 1− z2z′(q2) is also independent of γ1.
Figure 8: Case 1: Welfare in Country 1
W1|N
Γ1
*
Γ1
W1
Figure 9: Case 1: Optimal Policies
Figure 9 depicts the two country’s best response functions when only local currencies are ac-
cepted. In this case, monetary policies are independent and there is a dichotomy between the
two currencies. In Figure 9, BR1(γ1) is given by the vertical line and BR2(γ2) is given by the
horizontal line. Optimal policies are given by the intersection of BR1(γ1) and BR2(γ2) at (γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2),
which are both strictly above the Friedman rule, (β, β). Since buyers hold both home and foreign
currency (due to their precautionary demand for the latter), the policymaker in each country has
a temptation to inflate in order to extract seigniorage payments from foreigners. This generates
an externality for the other country that neither policymaker takes into account. In equilibrium,
monetary authorities trade off the gain from inflating with the cost of distorting allocations for its
citizens to set an optimal money growth rate that can deviate from the Friedman rule.
Case 2: Currency 1 is International
Next consider the equilibrium where sellers from country 2 accept currency 1 when γ1 < γ˜1 and
never accept foreign currency otherwise. That is, ζ = 1, Ω1 = {I1} and Ω2 = {N}. In this case,
both regimes N and I1 are possible. Although each country’s welfare function is continuous within
a regime, it is discontinuous at the transition from one regime to another. This is illustrated in
Figures 10 and 12, which plots country 1’s welfare as a function of its policy instrument, γ1, for a
given γ2. Country 1’s welfare function jumps down as the economy transitions from regime I1 to
regime N since country 1 enjoys higher welfare from issuing an international currency.
Consider the choice of policies when regime I1 exists. In that case, currency 1 is the sole
international currency and welfare in the two countries can be written
W1|I1 = B1T1 + αM1S(q1) + (1− α)M2θS(qb2) + (1− α)M1(1− θ)S(q1),
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W2|I1 = B2T2 + αM2S(qb2) + (1− α)M1θS(q1) + (1− α)M2(1− θ)S(qb2)− S2ψ2.
Within Regime I1, the policymakers’ best response functions are obtained by solving the first-order
conditions ∂W1|I1∂γ1 = 0 and
∂W2|I1
∂γ2
= 0, subject to the constraint that γ1 ∈ (β, γ˜1). Country 1’s
best-response function is
γ1 = BR1(γ1, γ2),
where BR1(γ1, γ2) ≡ 1− ẑ1z′(q̂1) +
(γ2−1)z′(q2)+z2
nz′(q̂1) depends on its own policy instrument γ1 implicitly
as well as the other country’s, γ2. Consequently, there is no longer a dichotomy between monetary
policies when foreigners accept currency 1 for trade. Similarly, country 2’s best-response function
is
γ2 = BR2(γ1, γ2),
where BR2(γ1, γ2) ≡ 1− z2z′(q2) +
n(γ1−1)z′(q̂1)+ẑ1
z′(q2) depends on both γ1 and γ2.
Figure 10: Case 2a: Welfare in Country 1 Figure 11: Case 2a: Optimal Policies (α = 0.8)
Figure 11 shows an example of optimal policies when currency 1 is internationally accepted in
region I1 and locally accepted otherwise under the assumption that it is much more likely to meet
locals than foreigners (α = 0.8). Country 1’s best response function is given by BR1(γ1, γ2) and is
always in region I1 since country 1 has strictly higher welfare by having an international currency
than by having local currencies. Moreover, BR1(γ1, γ2) is increasing in γ2 since a higher γ2 implies
a higher demand for currency 1, which increases country 1’s seigniorage revenue and hence incentive
to inflate. Foreign demand leads to seigniorage from abroad, which becomes a motive for money
issue. Figure 10 plots country 1’s welfare as a function of γ1 given γ
∗
2 and shows a Laffer Curve
effect: as inflation rises beyond γ∗1 , the quantity of money demanded falls and the tax base reduced.
As a result, there will be an interior money growth rate that maximizes the gain from inflating
with the cost of distorting allocations.
Country 2 on the other hand, does not have its currency accepted abroad but also inflates. When
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γ2 is in Regime N , its best response function is horizontal since monetary policies are independent
when only local currencies are accepted. In Regime I1 however, BR2(γ1, γ2) depends positively on
γ1 since a higher γ1 reduces demand for currency 1 while increasing demand for currency 2, which
increases country 2’s incentive to inflate. Equilibrium money growth rates are at the intersection
of the two country’s best response functions at (γ∗1 , γ∗2), which are both above the Friedman rule,
and lie within the shaded region where currency 1 is international.
Figure 12: Case 2b: Welfare in Country 1 Figure 13: Case 2b: Optimal Policies (α = 0.5)
Figure 13 shows how optimal policies change when countries become perfectly integrated (α =
1
2). In that case, the probability of trading with a foreigner is at the maximum, which increases
the amount of seigniorage generated abroad and maximizes the incentive to inflate, all else equal.
Figure 12 plots country 1’s welfare as a function of γ1 given γ
∗
2 and shows that W1 reaches its
maximum value at the transition from regime I1 to regime N . In this case, the threat of losing
international status places an inflation discipline on country 1. At γ∗1 , foreigners are just indifferent
between accepting and rejecting payment in currency 1. Consequently, country 1’s best response
to any γ2 for γ1 > γ
∗
1 is to inflate on the frontier, γ˜1, so that its currency remains international.
It is also possible to compare what happens to the optimal choice of inflation for the issuing
country if its currency loses international status.30
Proposition 4. A country chooses a higher inflation rate if it is the issuer of international currency
than if it loses international status, so long as the other country also inflates. That is, γ∗1 |I1 > γ∗1 |N
if γ∗2 > 1.
When γ∗2 > 1, the positive effect of extracting seigniorage from abroad outweighs the cost
of distorting allocations for its citizens. Since this inflationary tendency is curbed by the threat
of losing international status, country 1 does not inflate beyond the threshold that would induce
30I thank Emmanuel Farhi for this suggestion.
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foreigners to stop accepting its currency.31 When γ∗2 < 1, both countries are deflating which implies
a welfare-decreasing transfer of real resources by the domestic economy to foreigners. To minimize
this transfer abroad, the issuing country chooses a lower inflation rate when its currency circulates
abroad than when it does not: γ∗1 |I1 < γ∗1 |N . When γ∗1 = 1 and γ∗2 = 1, money supplies are
constant. Since neither country receives seigniorage revenues nor makes seigniorage transfers to
the other country, γ∗1 |I1 = γ∗1 |N .
5.2 Cooperative Policy
I now consider the case where the two monetary authorities cooperate by jointly choosing (γ1, γ2)
to maximize total welfare for the world. Joint welfare is simply measured as the sum of the two
countries’ welfare functions: W =W1 +W2.
Proposition 5. When monetary authorities cooperate at jointly choosing (γ∗1 , γ∗2) to maximize
total welfare for the world, W, and countries are perfectly integrated (α = 12), the unique optimal
policy is the Friedman rule, γ∗1 = γ∗2 = β. As a result, agents never accept foreign currency and
hold perfectly diversified portfolios of the two currencies. Equilibrium is socially efficient since no
resources are spent on information costs.
There can be gains from cooperating that are not realized when each country is pursuing its
own best interest. When policymakers can coordinate, there are no longer gains from redistributive
policies and hence no more temptation to inflate. In this case, the unique equilibrium is the
Friedman rule for both countries. Consequently, private citizens only accept their local currency
and society saves on information costs.
6 Quantitative Analysis
The preceding sections presented a simple two-country, two-currency search model that is amenable
to policy analysis. To quantify the welfare cost of losing international status (or the gain of achieving
it), the framework is generalized to an arbitrary number of countries and currencies and calibrated
to match international trade data. Since much of the set-up and analysis carries over from the
baseline model, the N -country, N -currency model is in Appendix B.
The regions of interest in the baseline analysis consist of three trading blocs: the United States,
the Eurozone, and China. The declining dollar, the advent of the euro and the recent rise of
31This desire by the issuing country to extract seigniorage from foreigners is also empirically relevant. Circumstan-
tial evidence from Rogoff (1998) suggests that the European Central Bank’s decision to issue large-denomination bills
can be interpreted as the desire to extract seigniorage revenue from foreign holders of euros and the underground
economy.
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China has renewed considerable interest in determining whether the dollar is at risk of losing its
international role. This paper provides a new theoretical framework to evaluate this issue. The
strategy taken here is to let the data and calibration procedure narrow down the set of equilibria
to ones that are empirically plausible. The model is then used to calculate the welfare benefits of
having an international currency for the issuing country and the rest of the world.
6.1 Calibration
To calibrate the model, the global economy is split into three trading blocs, or regions: the United
States, the Eurozone, and China.32 After discussing parameters that can be easily estimated or
fixed independently to their empirical counterparts, I describe the calibration procedure for the
remaining parameters. This procedure uses the model’s equations and the parameters calibrated
independently in order to find parameter values that match moments in the data. All data used
are in annual terms from 1999 to 2005 unless otherwise specified.
Following Lagos and Wright (2005), functional forms for utility and cost functions are U(x) =
Alnx, u(q) = ln(q + b) − ln(b), and c(q) = q. The parameter b is set to b = 0.0001 which ensures
a solution to the bargaining problem. The discount factor is set to β = 0.966, consistent with an
annual real interest rate of 3.5%. Since the model implies that gross money growth rates are also
gross inflation rates in a steady state equilibrium, γus, γeu, γch are set to average annual inflation
rates for the period 1999 to 2005, which is about 2.92% for the U.S., 1.97% for the Eurozone, and
5.04% for China, using data from the World Bank. Different inflation scenarios are also considered
in the quantitative exercise. The bargaining power parameter is set to θ = 0.5, consistent with an
egalitarian bargaining rule.33
The government size parameters are set to match the fraction of state-owned enterprises in a
particular country. The share of state-owned enterprises in the U.S. averaged to less less than 5%,
with 22% averaged across Europe, and 37% for China. These data are obtained from Szamosszegi
and Kyle (2011) and China’s Second National Economic Census (2009). The utility parameter A
and relative country sizes are jointly calibrated to match the ratio of each country’s GDP over
world GDP from Source OECD, which results in A = 2.03, nus = 0.36, neu = 0.37, and nch = 0.27.
The next set of parameters are the model’s meeting parameters for each country pair, µis. The
32The Eurozone, or the Euro Area, consists of the 17 European Union member states that have adopted the
euro as their common currency and sole legal tender (the euro was officially launched on January 1, 1999). These
countries include Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain. Data from each of the 17 member countries are averaged into an
aggregate measure for the Eurozone, with country weights determined by GDP.
33The bargaining power parameter θ can be calibrated to generate a mark-up consistent with the data, as in Craig
and Rocheteau (2008) and Lagos and Wright (2005). However, due to a lack of reliable data on mark-ups for countries
other than the United States, I simply set it equal for all countries at the egalitarian solution θ = 0.5.
33
six international meeting parameters µis are calibrated with bilateral trade data for the period 1999
to 2005 obtained from the European Commission Bilateral Affairs. Due to an accounting constraint
that the total measure of meetings between agents from country i with agents from country s have
to be the same as the total measure of meetings between agents from country s with agents from
country i, three of the meeting probabilities will not precisely match its targeted value. These
values are then backed out using calibrated values for ni, subject to the accounting constraint.
The final set of parameters are the costs of accepting different currencies. To discipline param-
eter values for information costs, I use data on the extensive margin of foreign currency holdings—
whether or not a country holds a particular foreign currency— and how much of a country’s trade is
denominated in a particular currency. Information on the extensive margin corresponds to private
sellers’ acceptance decision σs = (σ
us
s , σ
eu
s , σ
ch
s ) ∈ {0, 1}3, while international trade invoicing data
will partially determine a country’s trade composition in different currencies.34 This approach is
consistent with empirical evidence from Friberg and Wilander (2007) that the currency used in
trade invoicing is also the one used in actual payment.
In the U.S., only dollars circulate, so that σus = (1, 0, 0). In the Eurozone and China, dollars
are used in international trade invoicing, as reported in Goldberg and Tille (2007). In addition, the
Bank for International Settlements reports that U.S. dollars represent most of China’s settlement of
international trade while the use of euros in China comprise a much smaller share. This results in
σeu = (1, 1, 0) and σch = (1, 1, 1). Next I use data on international trade invoicing to pin down the
costs for accepting dollars in Europe and China. Goldberg and Tille (2007) report that the share of
dollar-denominated trade in Europe for 2002 ranges from 20.5% in Italy to 71.0% in Greece. I use
the reported European average of 32.4% of dollar-invoiced trade to generate the fraction of trades
using dollars in the Eurozone. Similarly in Asia, estimates of dollar-denominated trade range from
52.4% to 84.9%. I use the lower bound of 52.4% to determine the fraction of trades using dollars
in China. Friberg and Wilander (2007) report an Asia-wide average of 8% of trade denominated in
euros. Also as in the model, the cost of accepting one’s domestic currency is assumed to be zero.
Another way to think about the model’s cost to accept foreign money is a transaction cost
or participation fee in foreign exchange markets. As a robustness check and in order to facilitate
comparison with previous studies, I also present results for an alternative calibration in Appendix C
that uses transaction costs in foreign exchange markets as measured by bid-ask spreads for various
currency pairs.35 In Section 7, welfare calculations from both calibrations have similar magnitudes.
34Freeman and Kydland (2000) undertake a similar calibration procedure to determine values for transaction costs
by using data on currency-deposit ratios.
35The pattern of bid-ask spreads in the data provides a qualitative ranking of costs for the model that then drives
the decision to accept a particular currency. Appendix C describes the data and calibration in more detail and also
discusses a few shortcomings of this approach.
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Table 4: Parameter Values for 3-Region Model: U.S., Eurozone, China
Interpretation Value Target
b – 0.0001 Ensures solution to bargaining problem
A Output in CM 2.03 World GDP
β Discount factor 0.966 Annual real interest rate = 3.5%
γus Gross inflation (U.S.) 1.03 Average inflation rate (U.S.) = 3%
γeu Gross inflation (Eurozone) 1.02 Average inflation rate (Eurozone) = 2%
γch Gross inflation (China) 1.05 Average inflation rate (China) = 5%
θ Bargaining power 0.5 Egalitarian bargaining solution
gus Government size (U.S.) 0.05 Fraction state-owned enterprises (U.S.) = 0.05
geu Government size (Eurozone) 0.22 Fraction state-owned enterprises (Eurozone) = 0.22
gch Government size (China) 0.37 Fraction state-owned enterprises (China) = 0.37
ψ$eu Cost of accepting dollars in E.U. 0.024 E.U trades invoiced in dollars = 32%
ψ$ch Cost of accepting dollars in China 0.011 China trades invoiced in dollars = 52%
ψech Cost of accepting euros in China 0.079 China trades invoiced in euros = 8%
6.2 Parameter Estimates
Tables 4 and 5 summarize the baseline calibration results for the three region model. With this
calibration, the model can endogenously generate currency portfolios and quantities traded for a
given circulation pattern. The next sub-section discusses the payment arrangements that emerge.
Table 5: Calibrated Meeting Parameters: U.S., Eurozone, China
Parameter Estimate Target Moment Model Data
nus 0.36 GDP share (U.S.) 19.3% 19.1%
neu 0.37 GDP share (Eurozone) 19.7% 19.8%
nch 0.27 GDP share (China) 13.9% 14.3%
µus,eu 0.238 Share of U.S. trade with E.U 11.7% 17.8%
µus,ch 0.108 Share of U.S. trade with China 10.3% 14.9%
µeu,us 0.186 Share of E.U. trade with U.S. 14.0% 13.8%
µeu,ch 0.241 Share of E.U. trade with China 15.4% 13.3%
µch,us 0.227 Share of China trade with U.S. 13.8% 13.6%
µch,eu 0.268 Share of China trade with E.U. 17.0% 17.0%
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6.3 System of World Payments
For the quantitative exercise, it is assumed that government sellers from each country only accept its
domestic currency.36 Note that even with legal restrictions on payments in government transactions,
all private citizens are free to use any asset in their portfolio, which does not rule out an international
role for any currency.
The baseline calibration yields two types of payment patterns: (i) national currency circulation,
and (ii) one international currency (the dollar). Given that this transaction pattern reflects the
current state of affairs, what factors can cause hegemony to shift?
The theory implies that changes in inflation is a channel through which monetary policy can
influence macroeconomic outcomes. Figure 14 illustrates inflation’s effect on international currency
use. When U.S. inflation is low, there will be an equilibrium where only the dollar is internationally
accepted. As U.S. inflation rises, it becomes costlier to hold dollars which then increases the
expected benefit of accepting euros. Citizens in China substitute away from dollars into euros,
leading the euro to be accepted alongside the dollar in transactions abroad. If U.S. inflation
increases further, it may be possible that sellers from Europe no longer hold dollars and switch to
solely accepting euros. In this case, euros circulate abroad while the dollar loses its international
status and only circulates at home. Consequently, the extent to which the euro– or more generally,
any competing currency– assumes the international role of the dollar will depend on fundamentals,
such as monetary policy and inflation, as well as beliefs of market participants.
36To deal with China’s fixed exchange rate, I assume that its government transaction policy is used to affect the
DM market exchange rate with respect to the dollar, e = qus/qch. Suppose that the initial, unresticted equilibrium
is (qus, qch) = (q
0
us, q
0
ch), but the Chinese government announces the official value the yuan to be qch = q
0
ch −  while
the dollar remains at its market value qus. The equilibrium value of dollars stays the same while qch falls, moving
the exchange rate in favor of dollars. The yuan is therefore undervalued and would appreciate if exchange rates were
unrestricted. As in Li and Wright (1998), this results in a difference between official and market exchange rates in
the DM, as equilibrium qch differs from the official value q
0
ch − .
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Figure 14: Circulation Patterns and Inflation
7 Welfare Benefits of International Currency
There are normative consequences of a switch from one type of monetary regime to another, as
first discussed in Section 4.5, and these changes will generate real gains and losses for all countries
in terms of economic welfare. To study the welfare effects of potential shifts in payment patterns, I
follow the approach of Lucas (1987) and ask how much consumption agents demand, or are willing
to give up, as compensation to move from regime Ω ∈ {N, IUS , IEU} to another regime Ω′ 6= Ω,
where regime N denotes national currency use, regime IUS is one where the dollar is international,
and regime IEU is one where the dollar and euro share the international role.
Under a given regime Ω, steady-state welfare in each region i ∈ {us, eu, ch} is measured as
the steady-state sum of buyers’ and sellers’ surplus, weighted by their respective sizes: Wi =
Bi(1− β)V Bi (z1, z2) + Si(1− β)V Si (0, 0):
Wi(Ω) = U(x∗Ω)− x∗ + BiTi + αiMi
∑
k
σki S(q
k
ii(Ω)) + αijMjθ
∑
k
σkj S(q
k
ij(Ω))
+ αjiMi(1− θ)
∑
k
σkj S(q
k
ji(Ω)) + αi`M`θ
∑
k
σk` S(q
k
i`(Ω))
+ α`iMi(1− θ)
∑
k
σki S(q
k
`i(Ω))− Siσiψi,
where S(q(Ω)) is the equilibrium value for S(q) ≡ u(q) − c(q) given Ω. Welfare depends on three
components: (i) net consumption in the CM, (ii) net seigniorage revenue given by BiTi, and (iii)
surplus from trading in the decentralized markets net of any information costs.
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Suppose the economy moves from Ω to a different equilibrium Ω′, but also adjusts consumption
of all goods x and q by a common factor ∆. The amount 1−∆ then measures the percentage gain,
or loss if 1 − ∆ < 0, of consumption faced by agents per year. Adjusted or compensated welfare
then becomes
Wi(Ω) = U(x∗Ω∆)− x∗ + BiTi + αiMi{
∑
k
σki [S(q
k
ii(Ω)∆)]}
+ αijMjθ
∑
k
σkj [S(q
k
ij(Ω)∆) + αjiMi(1− θ)
∑
k
σkj [S(q
k
ji(Ω)∆)]
+ αi`M`θ
∑
k
σk` [S(q
k
i`(Ω)∆)] + α`iMi(1− θ)
∑
k
σki [S(q
k
`i(Ω)∆)]− Siσiψi.
The compensating variation value 1−∆ that solves Wi(Ω′) = Wi(Ω) is then the welfare benefit or
cost of moving from regime Ω to Ω′. If 1 −∆ > 0, agents are indifferent between being in Ω and
being in Ω′ with consumption reduced by 1 −∆ percent. Equivalently, agents are willing to give
up 1−∆ percent of consumption per year to be in regime Ω′ rather than regime Ω.
Table 6: Welfare Changes in Consumption Equivalent Terms (% of GDP per Year)
γUS = 1.03 γUS = 1.05 γUS = 1.06 γUS = 1.10
N to IUS N to IUS IUS to IEU IUS to IEU
1−∆US 1.41 2.07 -1.25 -1.56
1−∆EU 0.33 0.24 1.60 1.93
1−∆CH 0.39 0.32 0.28 0.25
Table 6 summarizes annual consumption equivalent welfare changes for transitions across var-
ious steady-state equilibria. For the U.S., the welfare benefit of having the dollar as the sole
international currency ranges from 1.41% to 2.07% of consumption per year.37
This gain derives from two sources. The first source is from increased seigniorage revenues from
foreigners. In reality, foreigners hold large quantities of U.S. dollars: Porter and Judson (1996)
report that approximately 60% of dollar banknotes are held abroad. The source of seigniorage for
the issuing country is therefore the ability to obtain real resources in exchange for virtually costless
notes. In turn, the model implies that the flow of this international seigniorage to the U.S. is
approximately 0.11% of GDP, consistent with Alogoskoufis and Portes (1991), Rogoff (1997), and
Portes and Rey (1998). The second source however comes from the model’s general equilibrium
effects of increased international exchange: due to the increased acceptability of the dollar, there is
37Under the alternative calibration strategy with bid-ask spread data reported in Appendix C, the welfare gain to
the U.S. is 1.33% to 1.98% of annual consumption.
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now more surplus from international transactions. As more people use the dollar, its value goes up,
which increases the amount of goods that can be purchased for a given unit. Finally, the impact
of changes in information costs across different equilibria are quantitatively negligible in terms of
annual GDP. While the absolute magnitudes of these costs are small, the model illustrates how
their qualitative rankings have significant consequences that drive the choice of an international
currency.
Both the Eurozone and China also benefit from using the dollar, owing to increased trade. The
gain is larger for China due to a lower inflation tax (3%) than its domestic level (5%). Although
Europe now must pay a higher inflation tax in a fraction of its transactions, this does not outweigh
the increased surplus from an expansion in trade opportunities with the United States. Column 3
shows that while welfare in the U.S. increases to 2.07% of consumption per year if inflation rises
from 3% to 5% due to more seigniorage revenue abroad, welfare in the Eurozone and China falls
due to the higher inflation tax. The analysis also shows that for the U.S., the welfare cost of losing
international status to the euro is 1.25% of annual consumption at a domestic inflation rate of 6%,
which comes at a gain of 1.60% per year for the Eurozone.
The results in Table 6 also highlight the distributional effects of inflation across countries. For
the issuing country, some inflation can be beneficial due to increased seigniorage revenue from
abroad. However this comes at the cost of harming foreigners who have to pay a higher inflation
tax. Monetary policy can therefore have distributional effects across countries by redistributing
wealth from foreigners to domestic agents.
7.1 Discussion
The welfare gains of international currency use in this paper are larger than previous estimates.
In particular, Portes and Rey (1998) report that the net gains from increased international use of
the euro is about 0.4% of GDP for Europe: this comes from a direct effect of increased seigniorage
(0.1% of annual consumption) plus gains from a liquidity discount (another 0.1% of GDP) plus
welfare gains due to reduced transaction costs on euro financial markets (0.2% of GDP).
The discrepancies between the results presented here and the estimates in Portes and Rey (1998)
come from the approach taken in their welfare analysis. The analysis in Portes and Rey (1998) is
based on Rey (2001)’s model of vehicle currencies in foreign exchange markets. The model implies
an inverse relationship between transaction costs and volumes, and they obtain a measure of the
efficiency gains or losses associated with potential shifts in world payment patterns by multiplying
transaction costs by volumes exchanged in each market and then summing across all markets.
However since transaction costs in Rey (2001) are equilibrium objects, this approach neglects to
capture the model’s full effects since a reduction in transaction costs will increase volumes, which
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will in turn reduce transaction costs.
When instead welfare changes are measured using a model-based compensated welfare approach
as in this paper, gains or losses are larger due to general equilibrium effects in international trade.
While the exact quantitative results presented here will be sensitive to alternative modeling as-
sumptions, such as the assumed pricing mechanism, or the calibration strategy for quantifying the
costs of accepting foreign currency, the main message from the analysis is clear: having a model
with microfoundations for international payments has quantitatively important implications for
welfare that should not be ignored.
8 Conclusion
This paper provides an information-based theory of international currency by generalizing the recent
model of asset liquidity by Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2012) to an open-economy setting. I
investigate some classic issues in international monetary economics, such as the emergence of an
international currency, the optimal choice of inflation in an open economy, and the welfare benefits
of international currency use. Instead of assuming the payments used in each country, citizens’
acceptance decision is made endogenous by letting private citizens choose which currencies to
accept. Further, government transaction policies are introduced to examine how certain policies—
namely ones which favor the use of a country’s national money— affect private agents’ acceptance
decisions and hence the set of equilibria. Fairly innocuous policies of the kind considered ended up
implying the connections observed in practice between currencies and countries.
This paper also explicitly modeled the strategic interaction among money issuers in a dynamic
policy game. An inflation Laffer curve emerges and captures the main tradeoffs faced by the
country issuing international currency. On the one hand, some inflation can be welfare-improving
since this increases the amount of seigniorage extracted from foreigners; but of course too much
inflation lowers the purchasing power of money. Since sovereign policymakers are only responsible
for welfare for their own citizens, they are not penalized for any negative effects that their policies
may have abroad. Non-cooperative behavior can therefore lead to optimal inflations rates above
the Friedman rule and hence inefficient outcomes. If instead externalities can be internalized in a
cooperative agreement, then all countries may benefit.
Quantitatively, the welfare cost of losing international status is not inconsequential for the
issuing country. For the United States, this amounts to about 1.3% to 2.1% of consumption each
year. This paper thus provides a first step in examining the effects of transitioning to different types
of payment regimes using a microfounded model where credit is imperfect and accepting foreign
currency comes at a cost. A useful direction for future work is to examine how these results are
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affected by extensions to the baseline model, such as incorporating a distribution of costs across
countries instead of assuming a fixed information cost or introducing entry decisions by domestic
or foreign firms. Using an alternative pricing mechanism, such as a mechanism design approach, is
another fruitful direction for future work.
Consistent with historical evidence from Eichengreen (2011), this paper questions the conven-
tional wisdom that competition for international currency status is a winner-take-all game. Just as
history shows that several international currencies have often shared this role in the past, the theory
implies that a likely situation for the future monetary system is one where several international
currencies compete and coexist.
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Appendix B
Model Without Precautionary Demand for Foreign Currency
In the baseline model, there is a precautionary for foreign currency since it allows buyers to self-
insure against the risk of not being able to use their domestic currency in some transactions.
Here I consider an alternative specification of the model where buyers know the nationality of the
seller they are matched with before making portfolio decisions. In particular, while agents are still
matched pairwise in the DM, buyers receive a preference shock at the beginning of each CM that
specifies which country’s goods they prefer and hence which country’s seller they match with in the
subsequent DM. The instantaneous utility function of a buyer in country 1 is given by
UB1 = αu(q1) + (1− α)u(q2) + U(x)− h,
where α ∈ {0, 1} is a random preference shock buyers receive in the CM that specifies which
country’s goods they prefer. When α = 1, buyers prefer domestic goods (and hence a buyer from
1 will be matched with a country 1 seller); when α = 0, the buyer prefers foreign goods (a buyer
from 1 will be matched with a country 2 seller).
The following table summarizes the different types of monetary equilibria that can arise, as-
suming that all buyers receive an α = 1 preference shock. In that case, buyers know they will
always match with a domestic seller.
Existence of Equilibria
Regime Buyer Conditions Seller Conditions Portfolios
N
i1 <
θ
1−θ ψ1 > ψ1 z1 > 0, z2 = 0
i2 <
θ
1−θ ψ2 > ψ2 ẑ1 = 0, ẑ2 > 0
I1
i1 < i2 − g2 θ1−θ ψ1 > ψ1 z1 > 0, z2 = 0
i2 <
θ
1−θ ψ2 < ψ˜2 ẑ1 > 0, ẑ2 > 0
I2
i1 <
θ
1−θ ψ1 < ψ˜1 z1 > 0, z2 > 0
i2 < i1 − g1 θ1−θ ψ2 > ψ2 ẑ1 = 0, ẑ2 > 0
U
i1 = i2 ≡ i ψ1 < ψ1 z1 + z2 > 0
i < θ1−θ ψ2 < ψ2 ẑ1 + ẑ2 > 0
Figure 15 represents the existence of different types of equilibria as a function of the money
growth rates or inflation rates in the two countries. As in the baseline model, the presence of
government agents affects the prevalence of international currency equilibria. When g1 > 0 and
g2 > 0, buyers may still meet government agents that only accept domestic currency even if private
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Figure 15: Existence of Equilibria in (γ1, γ2)-Space
sellers accept both. As a result, regimes I1 and I2 still feature a subset of buyers that hold both
currencies. As before, the fact that multiple currencies circulate at potentially different rates of
return for some fraction of internal trade means that currency substitution, or dollarization, is
occurring.
When government size is at its maximum (g1 = 1 and g2 = 1), the only equilibrium where both
currencies are valued is the national currencies equilibrium. In this case, the enforcement power of
the state drives foreign currency out of circulation of its country so that only national monies are
used. With no government (g1 = 0 and g2 = 0), regimes N, I1, I2, and U are all possible and there
is a coordination problem for a large region of the parameter space.
The non-monetary equilibria where only one currency is valued while the other is not (corre-
sponding to the regions labeled Z1 = 0 and Z2 = 0 in Figure 15) is a very robust feature of the
model and still survives in this alternative formalization. This type of equilibrium is consistent
with a fully dollarized world where a country has completely switched to a foreign currency such
as the dollar for internal trades while the highly inflationary domestic currency has been driven
out of circulation. Finally, an equilibrium where the two currencies become unified and are perfect
substitutes is another robust outcome of the model. This case arises when sellers from both coun-
tries accept both currencies. As in Kareken and Wallace (1981), if both currencies are acceptable
in trade, then the two must have the same rate of return. Consequently, there must be some kind
of market incompleteness or friction for two currencies to coexist with different rates of return.
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Appendix C
Alternative Calibration with Bid-Ask Spreads
Here I present quantitative results for an alternative calibration for three regions– the U.S., Eu-
rozone, and China– using historical data for bid-ask spreads. As before, the three region world
model is used as a framework to analyze alternative steady-state regimes and calculate the welfare
benefits of international currency use.
Parameter values for the model’s cost of accepting foreign currency are calibrated using bid-
ask spreads for currency pairs involving the U.S. dollar, euro, and the Chinese yuan. In general,
bid-ask spreads reflect the out-of-pocket costs incurred by investors and are an important factor
in determining the trading behavior of market participants. The pattern of bid-ask spreads in the
data then provides a qualitative ranking of costs for the model that then drives the decision to
accept a particular currency. I use historical bid-ask spread data for the three currency pairs over
the sample period 1999 to 2005 from Bloomberg. Table 7 reports the normalized bid-ask spreads
in the data, defined as the ask minus bid price divided by the bid-ask midpoint. Magnitudes for
these spreads are then mapped into the model’s costs by converting to utility units.
Table 7: Calibrated Information Costs Using Bid-Ask Spreads
Interpretation Value Target
ψ$eu Cost of accepting dollars in E.U. 0.0003 Mean euro/$ bid-ask spread = 0.07
ψ$ch Cost of accepting dollars in China 0.061 Mean $/yuan bid-ask spread = 3.18
ψech Cost of accepting euros in China 0.068 Mean euro/yuan bid-ask spread = 3.32
Table 8: Welfare Changes in Consumption Equivalent Terms (% of GDP per Year)
γUS = 1.03 γUS = 1.05 γUS = 1.06 γUS = 1.10
N to IUS N to IUS IUS to IEU IUS to IEU
1−∆US 1.33 1.98 -1.67 -1.79
1−∆EU -0.20 -0.27 1.41 1.57
1−∆CH -0.36 -0.38 0.07 0.04
As in the baseline analysis, the results in Table 8 reveal quantitatively significant welfare gains
for the country issuing an international currency. For the U.S., the welfare gain of having the dollar
as the sole international currency ranges from 1.33% to 1.98% of GDP per year and are of a similar
magnitude as the baseline calibration. For the Eurozone, the welfare gain of a switch from a regime
where the dollar is international to a regime where the euro is international ranges from 1.42% to
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1.67% of annual consumption. Gains are slightly larger for the Eurozone than for the U.S. owing
to higher GDP and lower average inflation rate in the former.
There are however some discrepancies between the costs in the model and bid-ask spreads in
the data. First, bid-ask spreads are variable costs that typically increase with the size of the trade,
whereas the model features a fixed cost incurred ex-ante. However bid-ask spreads can also be
interpreted as a participation fee that market participants have to incur to trade on foreign asset
markets. Second, transaction costs on foreign exchange markets may themselves be endogenous and
depend on market factors. It is important for the theory that the cost is incurred ex-ante, before
trades occur. While endogenizing this cost is beyond the scope of the present paper, constructing
a search-based theory of bid-ask spreads on foreign exchange markets can be done along the lines
of Lagos and Rocheteau (2009), where bid-ask spreads per unit of asset traded increase with the
size of the trade and decrease with the extent of search frictions.
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